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THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE
ACT: THE EXTENT OF DISCLOSURE REQUIRED
UNDER SECTIONS 203(b) AND (c)
Donovan v. The Rose Law Firm
768 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1985)
NAOMI BRAUDE*
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the history of the American labor movement, employ-
ers have engaged in anti-union activity.1 To aid in their anti-union ef-
forts, employers often hire attorneys and labor-relations consultants, 2
also known as "union-busters." These attorneys and consultants attempt
to persuade employees not to sign union authorization cards, to vote
against union representation or to vote for union decertification. "Per-
suader" activities may be distinguished, however, from other labor-re-
lated activities such as giving advice on labor matters, and representing
clients in court, in administrative proceedings and during collective
bargaining.
Congress enacted sections 203(b) and (c) of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 19593 (LMRDA) to
regulate persuaders4 and thus protect workers' statutory rights to organ-
ize and bargain collectively. 5 The underlying purpose of section 203(b) is
* B.A., University of Wisconsin, 1979; Candidate for J.D. IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law,
1987.
1. See Bernstein, Union-Busting: From Benign Neglect to Malignant Growth, 14 U.C.D. L.
REV. 3 (1980). (hereinafter cited as Bernstein).
2. Both attorneys and professional labor-relations consultants may act as persuaders. For the
purposes of this Comment, the term "consultant" will be used to include both attorneys and labor-
relations consultants who act as persuaders.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982) (hereinafter cited as LMRDA).
4. Congress enacted Title II of the LRMDA to "curb activities of middlemen in labor-man-
agement disputes .. ." S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2318, 2318, and in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 397, 398 (1959).
5. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 codifies the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively. Section 7 states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organiza-
tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). The National Labor Relations Act is found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
(1982).
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to force persuaders to publically disclose their persuader activity in order
to supply employees with information regarding the identity of the per-
suader. Once employees are aware that an attorney or labor-relations
consultant is not a disinterested third party but is in the "business" of
discouraging union activity, employees are better able to evaluate the
ideas and arguments presented to them by the persuader.
The extent to which an attorney or labor-relations consultant must
disclose persuader activity is currently in dispute among the circuit
courts. The Department of Labor has taken the position that once an
attorney or consultant engages in persuader activity, he must disclose
receipts and disbursements on behalf of every employer for whom he per-
formed any labor-relations consulting services during the fiscal year.
Four circuit courts6 have agreed with the Labor Department's position.
The Eighth Circuit, in Donovan v. The Rose Law Firm,7 recently held,
however, that the LMRDA does not require the disclosure of informa-
tion with respect to labor-related clients who did not use the attorney as
a persuader. According to the Eighth Circuit, a persuader need only
disclose receipts from and disbursements on behalf of an employer-client
for whom he acted as a persuader.8
This Comment will demonstrate that Congress intended to protect
workers' statutory rights by requiring persuaders to disclose all of their
labor-related activities, not merely persuader activities. The Comment
will examine sections 203(b) 9 and (c) 10 of the LMRDA, and will address
6. Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1985), and Don-
ovan v. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. IlI. 1981), aff'd, 699 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Price v. Wirtz, 412 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc);
Douglas v. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966).
7. 768 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1985).
8. Id. at 974-75.
9. Section 203(b) of the LMRDA states:
Every person who pursuant to any agreement or arrangement with an employer undertakes
activities where an object thereof is, directly, or indirectly-
(1) to persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise, or persuade employees as to the
manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing; or
(2) to supply an employer with information concerning the activities of employees or a
labor organization in connection with a labor dispute involving such employer, except in-
formation for use solely in conjunction with an administrative or arbitral proceeding or a
criminal or civil judicial proceeding;
shall file within thirty days after entering into such agreement or arrangement a report with
the Secretary, signed by its president and treasurer or corresponding principal officers,
containing the name under which such person is engaged in doing business and the address
of its principal office, and a detailed statement of the terms and conditions of such agree-
ment or arrangement. Every such person shall file annually, with respect to each fiscal
year during which payments were made as a result of such an agreement or arrangement, a
report with the Secretary, signed by its president and treasurer or corresponding principal
officers, containing a statement (A) of its receipts of any kind from employers on account
of labor relations advice or services, designating the sources thereof, and (B) of its disburse-
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their purpose in publicizing persuader activity so that employees are able
to understand the source of a persuader speech. Finally, the Comment
will explore the persuaders' contention that requiring complete disclo-
sure chills the employers' first amendment rights to speak out on the
subject of unionism.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Legislative History of the LMRDA
The union-busting business existed before the enactment of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935.11 Employers used private
detectives, spies, hired guns and law enforcement officers to fight the
growing labor movement. Anti-union tactics included injunctions, law-
suits and jailings as well as "spying, blacklisting, firing, physical intimi-
dation . . . [and] . . . violence."' 2  While some of these tactics
disappeared1 3 following the enactment of the NLRA, the persistence of
anti-union sentiment gave rise to new methods for fighting labor organi-
zations. For example, the "labor-relations consultant" emerged as a tool
against organized labor.14
The Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor
or Management Field, better known as the McClellan Committee, inves-
tigated illegal and unethical activities on the part of employers and labor-
relations consultants. Created to uncover corruption and racketeering
within labor organizations,1 5 the Committee also discovered serious
ments of any kind, in connection with such services and the purposes thereof. In each such
case such information shall be set forth in such categories as the Secretary may prescribe.
29 U.S.C. § 433(b) (1982).
10. Section 203(c) of the LMRDA states:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any employer or other person to file a
report covering the services of such person by reason of his giving or agreeing to give
advice to such employer or representing or agreeing to represent such employer before any
court, administrative agency, or tribunal of arbitration or engaging or agreeing to engage in
collective bargaining on behalf of such employer with respect to wages, hours, or other
terms or conditions of employment or the negotiation of an agreement or any question
arising thereunder.
29 U.S.C. § 433(c) (1982).
11. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 3. See also HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPORT OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND
LABOR, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., PRESSURES IN TODAY'S WORKPLACE 26 (Comm. Print 1981).
12. PRESSURES IN TODAY'S WORKPLACE, supra note 11, at 26. See also Bernstein, supra note
1, at 3.
13. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 3.
14. Today, the union-busting business is comprised of private consulting firms, law firms, in-
dustrial psychologists, employer and trade associations, non-profit advocacy organizations and pub-
lic officials. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 4-10.
15. The McClellan Committee was created after the Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Senate Committee on Governmental Operations discovered evidence of union corruption and racke-
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abuses by employers, and labor relations consultations with respect to
union activity. The McClellan Committee reports
[describe] management middlemen flitting about the country on behalf
of employers to defeat attempts at labor organization. In some cases
they work directly on employees or through committees to discourage
legitimate organizational drives or set up company-dominated unions.
These middlemen have been known to negotiate sweetheart contracts.
They have been involved in bribery and corruption as well as unfair
labor practices. The middlemen have acted, in fact if not in law, as
agents of management. 16
The revelation of abuses within the ranks of labor and management
prompted Senators Kennedy and Ives to introduce the first of a series of
labor-management reform bills predicated on the theory that mandatory
reporting and disclosure by both labor and management would discour-
age unlawful activity. The Kennedy-Ives bilP 7 (Senate Bill 3974) con-
tained section 103(b), the first version of sections 203(b) and (c) of the
LMRDA. Section 103(b)18 required a person engaged in persuader ac-
tivity to file with the Secretary of Labor an annual financial report con-
teering. See Beaird, Reporting Requirements For Employers and Labor Relations Consultants in the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 53 GEO. L. J. 267, 269 (1965).
16. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2318, 2326-27, and in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 397, 406 (1959).
17. S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CONG. REC. 18, 261-62 (1958).
18. Section 103(b) of the Kennedy-Ives bill stated:
Every person engaged in providing labor relations consultant services to an employer en-
gaged in an industry affecting commerce pursuant to any agreement or arrangement under
which such consultant undertakes-
(A) to influence or affect employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by section 7
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or by the Railway Labor Act, as
amended, or
(B) to provide an employer involved in a labor dispute with the services of paid infor-
mants or investigators, or any agency or instrumentality engaged in the business of inter-
fering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by
section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by the Railway Labor Act, as
amended, or
shall file annually a report with the Secretary, signed by its president and treasurer or
corresponding principal officers, containing the following information:
(1) the name under which the labor relations consultant is engaged in doing business and
the address of its principal place of business;
(2) receipts of any kind from employers on account of labor relations advice or services,
designating the sources thereof;
(3) disbursements of any kind, in connection with such services and the purposes thereof;
and
(4) a detailed statement of such agreement or arrangement.
Provided, That nothing in this section shall be construed to require a report from a labor
relations consultant retained by an employer by reason of his giving advice to such em-
ployer or representing such employer in any court or administrative agency or engaging in
collective bargaining on behalf of such employer with respect to wages, hours, or other
terms or conditions of employment or the negotiation of an agreement or any question
arising thereunder.
S. 3974, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 104 CONG. REC. 18, 261-62 (1958).
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taining receipts and disbursements made in connection with the
persuader activity.19 In addition, section 103(b) contained a proviso indi-
cating that no report would be required when an attorney was hired to
advise, or to represent the employer in court, before an administrative
agency or in collective bargaining. The Kennedy-Ives bill passed the
Senate but encountered opposition in the House due to its broad report-
ing requirements for employers.
The following year, Senators Kennedy and Ervin introduced Senate
Bill 505. The Kennedy-Ervin bill contained section 103(b)20 which re-
quired a persuader to file an annual financial report detailing agreements,
receipts and disbursements made with respect to persuader activity.
However, Senate Bill 505 did not contain the Kennedy-Ives proviso ex-
empting attorneys hired to advise, or to represent their employer-clients
in court, before administrative agencies or in collective bargaining. In-
stead, it included section 103(c) which stated that "[n]othing in this sec-
tion shall be construed to require any employer or labor relations
consultant to file a report covering the services of a consultant by reason
of his giving ... advice ... or representing ... before any court . . . or
engaging... in collective bargaining on behalf of such employer .... ,,2,
The Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare began hearings on Senate Bill 505. At the conclusion of
19. The Kennedy-Ives bill did not use the word "persuader." Rather, the language of section
103(b) referred to activities "to influence or affect employees." S. 3974, 85th Cong. 2d Sess., 104
CONG. REC. 18, 261 (1958).
20. Section 103(b) of the Kennedy-Ervin bill stated:
Every person engaged in providing labor relations consultant service to an employer en-
gaged in an industry affecting commerce pursuant to any agreement or arrangement under
which such consultant undertakes activities where an object thereof is, directly or
indirectly,
(A) to persuade employees not to exercise, or persuade employees as to the manner of
exercising, the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing;
(B) to supply an employer with information concerning the activities of employees or a
labor organization in connection with a labor dispute, except information for use solely in
conjunction with a judicial, administrative or arbitral proceeding, shall file annually a re-
port with the Secretary, signed by its president and treasurer or corresponding principal
officers, containing the following information:
(1) the name under which the labor relations consultant is engaged in doing business and
the address of its principal place of business;
(2) receipts of any kind from employers on account of labor relations advice or services,
designating the sources thereof;
(3) disbursements of any kind, in connection with such services and the purposes thereof;
and
(4) a detailed statement of the terms of such agreement or arrangement.
S. 505, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MAN-
AGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 29, 40-41 (1959).
21. S. 505, 86th Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 29, 41-42 (1959).
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the hearings Senate Bill 505 emerged as Senate Bill 155522 and passed the
Senate.
23
The House Committee on Education and Labor held hearings on
labor-management reform legislation. In 1958 and 1959, five bills were
introduced in the House of Representatives. 24 Upon conclusion of the
hearings, the House Labor Committee reported House Resolution
8342,25 known as the Elliott bill, to the House. This bill did not refer to
persuader activity. Instead, the bill required reporting and disclosure
only if the consultant's activities were intended to "interfere with, coerce,
or restrain" 26 employees in their right to organize and bargain collec-
tively. Additionally, the Elliott bill conferred a much broader exemption
on consultants than did Senate Bill 1555 and extended a corresponding
exemption to employer-clients. Specifically, section 204 of the Elliott bill
exempted an attorney and an employer-client from reporting confidential
information including the existence of the relationship, financial details,
"or any information obtained, advice given, or activities carried on by the
attorney within the scope of the legitimate practice of law." '27
Representatives Landrum and Griffin introduced House Resolution
8400.28 Its employer and consultant reporting requirements and the at-
torney-client privilege provision were identical to those contained in the
Elliott bill. The Landrum-Griffin bill passed the House, adopting the
aforementioned provisions of the Elliott bill.
22. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LA-
BOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 516 (1959).
23. Section 103(b) of S. 505 differed from § 203(b) of S. 1555. While S. 505 required an annual
report detailing the receipts, disbursements and terms of the persuader agreement, S. 1555 required a
monthly report. It was not until the Conference Committee agreed on the final version of § 203(b)
that both thirty day and annual reports were required.
24. H.R. 4473 and H.R. 4474, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (introduced by Rep. Barden); H.R.
7265, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (introduced by Rep. Kearns); H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959) (introduced by Rep. Elliott: favorably reported by Committee on Education and Labor;
passed the House after floor debates and amendments by incorporation of text of H.R. 8400, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (introduced by Reps. Landrum and Griffin)); H.R. 8490, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1959) (introduced by Rep. Shelley). See generally 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 (1959).
25. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 687 (1959).
26. H.R. 8342 stated that "the term 'interfere with, restrain or coerce' as used in this section
means interference, restraint and coercion which, if done with respect to the exercise of rights guar-
anteed in section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, would, under section 8(a) of such Act,
constitute an unfair labor practice." H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in I NLRB, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at
687, 713 (1959).
27. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 687, 713 (1959).
28. H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT of 1959, at 619 (1959).
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The House and Senate conferees met in Conference Committee to
reconcile Senate Bill 1555 and House Resolution 8400. The Committee
chose the Senate's reporting criteria for labor-relations consultants.
First, the Committee decided that reporting requirements would be trig-
gered not by actual interference, restraint or coercion, but by mere at-
tempts by attorneys or consultants to persuade 29 employees. Second, the
conferees required consultants to file, within thirty days after entering
into an agreement with an employer, a report setting out the terms and
conditions of the agreement. Third, the Committee decided that an an-
nual financial report disclosing receipts and disbursements is required.
The Conference bill passed both the House and Senate and became law in
1959.
Thus, section 203(b) of the LMRDA requires that every person
hired by an employer to persuade employees to join or not to join a union
must file financial disclosure reports with the Secretary of Labor. A re-
port detailing the terms of the agreement between the employer and the
persuader must be filed within thirty days after an agreement is reached.
The section also requires a person engaging in persuader activity to file
an annual report disclosing client names, receipts and disbursements for
labor-relations advice and services provided during the preceding fiscal
year. 30 However, section 203(c) exempts reporting when an attorney has
given advice, represented the employer in court or before an administra-
tive agency or engaged in collective bargaining on behalf of the
employer. 3 1
Case Law Supports Full Disclosure
The Department of Labor takes the position that the LMRDA re-
quires full disclosure of all labor-relations activity if an attorney or con-
sultant acts as a persuader for one or more employers. The Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits support 32 this position, relying on the
language and legislative history of the statute. Furthermore, the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits found that the requirement of full disclosure does
not offend the employer's first amendment right to free speech. 33
In Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan,34 Donovan v.
29. Persuasion includes speeches to employees in which the persuader encourages the employ-
ees to vote against union representation. "Interference, restraint or coercion" include direct tactics
such as firing, threats and violence.
30. See supra note 9.
31. See supra note 10.
32. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
34. 755 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1985).
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Master Printer's Ass'n, 3 5 Price v. Wirtz36 and Douglas v. Wirtz,37 the
courts held that the language of sections 203(b) and (c) compels a con-
sultant to fully disclose all of his non-persuader labor-relations activity
when he engages in persuader activity for one or more employers. They
noted that section 203(b)(1) (the persuader clause) discusses only per-
suader activity and does not include the word "advice." The courts
viewed Congress' failure to include the word "advice" as an indication
that the entire section applies only to persuader activity. Section
203(b)(A) (the annual report section) states, however, that a consultant
must include in his annual report receipts and disbursements in provid-
ing advice and services. The courts concluded that both persuader and
advice information is required in the annual report.3 8 Thus, if a consult-
ant engaged in persuader activity and also gave advice, and represented
employers in court, in administrative proceedings, or in the negotiations
the persuader would be required to disclose financial information relating
to all of these activities in his annual report.
The four circuits also examined the legislative history of the Act as
further support for their position that the LMRDA requires full disclo-
sure. Specifically, the courts pointed to Senate Report 187 which accom-
panied Senate Bill 1555 and which stated:
[a]n attorney or consultant who confines himself to giving legal advice,
taking part in collective bargaining and appearing in court or adminis-
trative proceedings would not be included among those required to file
reports under this subsection [§ b]. Specific exemption for persons giv-
ing this type of advice is contained in [section 203(c)]. 39
Thus, the courts concluded that section 203(c)'s exemption applies only
when a consultant has not engaged in persuader activity.
In addition, the courts reasoned that full disclosure satisfies the
goals of the statute. Congress intended to subject persuaders to public
scrutiny.4° According to the courts, disclosure enables employees to
35. 532 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd, 699 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1040 (1984).
36. 412 F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
37. 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966).
38. See, e.g., Douglas v. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30, 32 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909
(1966).
39. See, e.g., Price v. Wirtz, 412 F.2d 647, 651 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), quoting S. REP. No.
187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2318, 2328, and in I
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT
OF 1959, at 397, 408 (1959).
40. Senate Report 187 states:
Under section 103(b) every person who enters into an agreement with an employer to
persuade employees as regards the exercise of their right to organize and bargain collec-
tively or to supply an employer with information concerning the activity of the employees
or labor organizations in connection with a labor dispute would be required to file a de-
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"consider the source" of the persuader speech presented to them.4' The
courts noted that Congress was not addressing the act of "persuasion"
itself, "but the tendency of persuaders to engage in unfair labor
practices. '42
Finally, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits43 examined the constitution-
ality of section 203(b) and found that requiring full disclosure does not
constitute a first amendment violation. The courts reasoned that full
disclosure does not substantially burden the employer's first amendment
rights by exposing him to a threat of violence or loss of business. 44 Fur-
thermore, the government's interest in maintaining harmonious labor re-
lations outweighs any chill on the employer's freedom of speech.45
Finally, the courts held that under Buckley v. Valeo, full disclosure is
"substantially related" to the government's interest in maintaining har-
monious labor relations. Full disclosure aids employees in understanding
the source of a persuader's speech 46 and thereby exercising their statu-
tory rights.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1980, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America engaged in a union organizing drive at the Monark Boat Com-
pany in Monticello, Arkansas. Monark's management hired the Rose
Law Firm to deliver speeches to Monark employees47 in an attempt to
tailed report. An attorney or consultant who confines himself to giving legal advice, taking
part in collective bargaining and appearing in court or administrative proceedings would
not be included among those required to file reports under this subsection. Specific exemp-
tion for persons giving this type of advice is contained in subsection (c) of section 103.
All of the activities required to be reported by this section are not illegal nor are they
unfair labor practices. However, since most of them are disruptive of harmonious labor
relations and fall into a gray area, the committee believes that if an employer or a consult-
ant indulges in them, they should be reported. This public disclosure will accomplish the
same purpose as public disclosure of conflicts of interest and other union transactions
which are required to be reported in sections 101 and 102 of this bill.
S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2318,
2328, and in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 397, 408 (1959).
41. Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211, 1222 (6th Cir. 1985);
Donovan v. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140, 1150 (N.D. 11. 1981), aff'd, 699 F.2d 370 (7th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
42. Donovan v. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140, 1150 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aft'd, 699 F.2d
370 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
43. See Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1985) and
Donovan v. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. I1. 1981), aff'd, 699 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
44. See, e.g., Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley, 755 F.2d at 1221.
45. Id. at 1221-22.
46. See, e.g., Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley, 755 F.2d at 1222.
47. Brief for Appellee at 2, Donovan v. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1985).
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persuade the employees to vote against union representation. The Rose
Law Firm also advanced money to Monark to lease a film that advised
employees against joining the union.48
The Department of Labor requested that the firm file LMRDA
monthly and annual disclosure statements. Rose filed the monthly state-
ment detailing the terms of its persuader agreement with Monark, and
the annual financial statement detailing receipts from and disbursements
on behalf of Monark, the only employer for whom the firm performed
persuader services. However, the firm refused to disclose financial infor-
mation for labor clients who did not use the firm for persuader activity.
The Secretary of Labor brought suit against the Rose Law Firm requir-
ing financial disclosure of services for all of its labor clients.
The district court ruled in favor of the Labor Department. In an
unpublished opinion, 49 the district court agreed with the holdings in
Donovan v. Master Printer's Ass'n, Price v. Wirtz, and Douglas v. Wirtz
that the LMRDA requires full disclosure. The court held that "there
exists a substantial relation between the government's interest [in dis-
couraging persuader activity] and [full] disclosure." 50
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court. 51 It held that the
annual report required by the LMRDA must disclose persuader services
performed for the particular employer-client using those services.52
However, the court declined to require disclosure of the firm's labor-con-
sulting services for those clients who did not utilize the firm for per-
suader activity.5 3
The court based its reasoning on the language and legislative history
of section 203. The court asserted that Congress intended for the annual
disclosure statements to include only receipts and disbursements for
those clients who used the firm's persuader services. 54 The court rea-
soned that while Congress created a broad duty of disclosure in section
203(b) for those engaged in persuader activity, Congress severely limited
that disclosure in section 203(c). 55
48. The advance was later charged to Monark Boat Company's account. Brief for Appellee at
2, Donovan v. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d 964 (8th Cir. 1985).
49. Donovan v. The Rose Law Firm, No. 83-784 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
50. Donovan v. The Rose Law Firm, No. 83-784, slip op. at 3-4 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
51. Justice Bright dissented in Donovan v. The Rose Law Firm. The dissent agreed with the
reasoning of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits that the LMRDA requires full disclosure.
The dissent also rejected the majority's constitutional argument that no compelling govermental
interest is served by full disclosure. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 976.
52. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 975.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 974.
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In support of its decision to limit disclosure, the court first examined
the difference between the proviso in section 103(b) 56 of the Kennedy-
Ives bill and section 203(c) of the LMRDA. The Rose court noted that
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits failed to consider the differ-
ences between the Kennedy-Ives proviso (section 103(b)) and section
203(c) of the LMRDA. The Rose court read the Kennedy-Ives proviso,
which provided that an attorney is not required to file a report when he is
hired by an employer-client to give advice as "merely making an implicit
point explicit. . . ." According to the court, the proviso explained only
that a report is not required when an attorney gives advice.57 It does not
speak to the contents of disclosure for persuader activity. However, the
court interpreted section 203(c) of the LMRDA as specifically limiting
the contents of the financial disclosure report. Section 203(c) states that
"[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require any employer or
other person to file a report covering the services of such person by reason
of his giving or agreeing to give advice .... "58 Thus, section 103(b) of
the Kennedy-Ives bill stated that reporting is not necessary when the
attorney or consultant is giving advice, while section 203(b) of the
LMRDA states that a person who provides persuader services must re-
port the giving of advice. The court thus concluded that the section
203(c) limit on disclosure, by analogy to the Kennedy-Ives proviso, is a
broad-based exception to section 203(b). 59
The court next attacked the argument advanced by the four circuits
that Senate Report 187 indicated that an attorney is exempt from report-
ing only if he does not engage in any persuader activity. Senate Report
187, which accompanied Senate Bill 1555, stated that "[a]n attorney or
consultant who confines himself to giving legal advice ... would not be
included among those required to file reports under [section 103(b)]."'' 6
The Rose court, however, drew a distinction between whether the attor-
ney must disclose (under 203(b)) and what an attorney must disclose
(under 203(c)). The court argued that Senate Report 187 indicated only
that an attorney who has not engaged in persuader activity, who has
confined himself to giving advice, has no obligation to report.61 The
court emphasized that Senate Report 187 did not specify what is to be
56. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
57. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 971.
58. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 971, quoting 29 U.S.C. § 433(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
59. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 971.
60. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2318, 2328, and in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING
AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 397, 408 (1959).
61. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 972.
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included in the report when an attorney engaged in persuader activity. 62
Attempting to answer the question raised by Senate Report 187, the
court relied on Conference Report 1147, the final conference report
before the emergence of the Landrum-Griffin Act. Quoting the Confer-
ence Report, the court stated that section 203(c) of the LMRDA is a
"broad exemption from the requirements of [section 203(b)]. ' ' 63 The
court further stated that "Conf. Rep. No. 1147 is the most compelling
indication of congressional intent as to the meaning of § 203(c)." 64
The court also found that Congress intended to require congruity of
reporting within the LMRDA. Thus, Congress did not intend to require
broad reporting for persuaders under sections 203(b) and (c) and limited
reporting for employers under section 203(a).65
Finally, the court chose not to reach the constitutional questions
raised by the Rose Law Firm. The court had "difficulty perceiving the
compelling governmental interest to be served by the reporting of all re-
ceipts and disbursements related to any labor-relations advice given to or
services performed for clients for whom a consultant has not performed
any persuader activity." '66
ANALYSIS
The Eighth Circuit erred in reversing the district court's decision
requiring full disclosure. The language and legislative history of sections
203(b) and (c) do not clearly indicate whether full disclosure is required.
However, the purpose behind the statute-the publication of persuader
activity-leads to the conclusion that Congress intended full disclosure.
Public disclosure of persuader activity enables employees to "consider
the source" of the information they are given during the union represen-
tation campaign, allowing them to make an informed decision about
union representation. However, full disclosure causes serious problems
for an attorney/persuader and his other labor clients, and thus indirectly
discourages persuader activity. Nevertheless, at least two circuits have
held that any potential first amendment claim by a persuader is out-
weighed by the government's interest in promoting harmonious labor
relations.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 974, quoting CONF. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2318, 2505, and in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 934, 937 (1959).
64. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 974.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 975.
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I.
When read together, sections 203(b) and (c) are ambiguous. 67 The
language does not clearly state whether a persuader is required to report
the finances for persuader clients only or whether he must report finances
of all labor-related clients for whom he performed any labor-consulting
services during the year. Despite this ambiguity, however, the Rose
court's reading of the statute as requiring limited disclosure is
unpersuasive.
The court asserted that section 203(c) represents a broad-based ex-
emption to section 203(b) since section 203(c) states that it does not re-
quire reporting when a consultant gives advice, or represents an
employer in court or in collective bargaining. According to the Rose
court, section 203(c) exempts a consultant from reporting any labor-re-
lated advice. 68 However, the Rose court ignored a more plausible inter-
pretation of section 203(c). Section 203(c) can be interpreted to mean
that a persuader is exempt from reporting only when he has not engaged
in any persuader activity. If he engaged in persuader activity, he must
report all labor-related activities. This construction is supported by the
language of sections 203(b) and (c). Since section 203(b) requires disclo-
sure when a consultant gives advice or persuades, and section 203(c)'s
exemption provision does not mention persuasion, section 203(c) indi-
cates that a consultant is exempt from reporting only if he has not en-
gaged in any persuader activity.
The court relied on Senate Report 187 as further evidence that its
construction is correct.69 The court noted that Senate Report 187 does
not specify what is to be included in the annual report when a consultant
acts as a persuader, suggesting that the report should only include per-
suader activity. However, the court failed to consider an alternative con-
struction of the statute. The language stating "an attorney or consultant
who confines himself to giving legal advice ...would not be included
among those required to file reports. .. o could just as easily mean that
67. The Rose Law Firm court admits that the language is ambiguous and subject to conflicting
interpretations. Id. at 970. One commentator states that §§ 203(b) and (c) compel opposite conclu-
sions. This, he says, "is another example of the ambiguities" characteristic of the statute. See
Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARv. L. REV. 851, 891
(1960).
68. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 975.
69. Id. at 972.
70. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 972, quoting S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2318, 2328 and in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HiS-
TORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 397, 408
(1959).
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the section 203(c) exemption only applies when there is no persuader
activity.
Furthermore, the Rose court asserted that Conference Report 1147
confirms its view that section 203(c) is a broad exemption to section
203(b). 71 While Conference Report 1147 does state that section 203(c) is
a broad exemption to section 203(b), the Report does not indicate when
section 203(c) exempts reporting.
Further analysis of the statutory language sheds light on the proper
construction of the statute. Section 203(c) states that "[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to require any employer or other person to file
a report covering the services of such person by reason of his giving ad-
vice .... ,,72 This section does not mean that advice is always exempt
from disclosure. Section 203(b)(A) requires disclosure for advice and
persuasion. Therefore, section 203(c) cannot exempt all reporting of
both persuader and non-persuader advice since section 203(b)(A) calls
for reporting of advice. Section 203(b) simply means that giving advice,
and representing employers in court or in collective bargaining does not
always require reporting. The section requires reporting when the attor-
ney has engaged in persuader activity.73
The court also stated that sections 203(b) and (c) were not meant to
require broad reporting for persuaders since section 203(a) requires only
limited reporting for employers.74  While there may be merit in the
court's argument that Congress intended the sections to be congruous,
there is nothing in the Congressional reports to indicate that this was an
overriding concern of Congress.
II.
The Rose court addressed the language of the statute but failed to
address the statute's purpose of publicizing persuader activity. These
omissions are significant because the language of the statute is so ambigu-
ous that a complete statutory interpretation must include policy consid-
erations. Since the court emphasized the statute's language rather than
its purpose, the court did not have to explain its construction of the
statute.
The congressional intent behind section 203(b) was not to stamp out
persuader activity but to publicize it. Since some members of Congress
71. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 974.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 433(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
73. Commentators have supported this interpretation of the statute. See Beaird, supra note 15,
at 291 and I GA. L. REV. 128, 134 (1967).
74. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 975.
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were concerned that persuaders tended to engage in unfair labor prac-
tices, 75 full disclosure was seen as a way to subject a persuader to public
scrutiny so that he would be unable "to couch [his] function as 'advice'
rather than persuasion. '76 The Fifth Circuit, in Price v. Wirtz, empha-
sized the purpose of the statute in interpreting its language. The Price
court stated that the difficulty in distinguishing between persuader and
non-persuader activity, and the ease with which a persuader can conceal
illegal speeches justified subjecting the persuader to full disclosure."7
Full disclosure enables employees to understand the source of the
information they are given during the election campaign. 78 If persuader
activity is presented as advice from an unbiased third party, employees
are unable to critically evaluate the persuader's message. Workers who
know that a persuader is in the business of discouraging union activity
may be skeptical of the persuader's message. Consequently, the speech
will have less of an impact on the employees' freedom to organize and
bargain collectively.
The National Labor Relations Act protects the rights of both em-
ployees and employers. Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA 79 protects the
rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively, while section
8(c) 80 protects the rights of employers to comment on union representa-
tion. Thus, a fine line exists between the employer's right to comment on
labor matters and the employees' right to exercise their rights without
unlawful interference. The employer has the right to hire a consultant to
persuade his employees not to join the union. Nevertheless, the employ-
ees will be unable to put the persuader's speech into the proper context
unless they are aware of the persuader's other labor-related activities.
An employee's decision regarding union representation will be an in-
75. Senate Report 187 stated:
All of the activities required to be reported by . . . [section 203(b)] are not illegal nor are
they unfair labor practices. However, since most of them are disruptive of harmonious
labor relations and fall into a gray area, the committee believes that if. . .a consultant
indulges in them, they should be reported.
S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2318,
2328, and in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 397, 408 (1959).
76. Donovan v. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140, 1150 (N.D. Il1. 1981), affd, 699 F.2d
370 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
77. Price v. Wirtz, 412 F.2d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
78. Donovan v. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140, 1150 (N.D. Ill. 1981), afid, 699 F.2d
370 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
79. Section 8(a)(1) states that it is "an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 [to organize
and bargain collectively]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
80. Section 8(c) of the NLRA states that it is not an unfair labor practice for an employer to
express views, arguments, or opinions about a labor union. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1982).
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formed one only if he knows that the persuader is in the business of
union-busting. Thus Congress enacted Section 203(b) as a compromise
that allows employers to comment as long as they disclose. Through
disclosure, the employees can properly evaluate the speech in light of the
persuader's other activities.
III.
The purpose of financial disclosure is to publicize persuader activity.
However, the practical effect of full disclosure may be to inhibit an attor-
ney from engaging in persuader activity. Full disclosure of all labor-
consulting activities impacts the attorney-client relationship.8' The at-
torney is forced to divulge the names of labor-related clients, receipts,
disbursements, and the nature of the activities performed on behalf of the
client. Thus, the attorney who engages in persuader activity may lose
clients for whom he provides non-persuader labor-relations services. The
client might not want his name associated with a law firm with a reputa-
tion for union-busting. The attorney may also lose a persuader client if
he chooses not to persuade for fear of losing other clients.
In addition, an "innocent" client whose name is revealed through
disclosure might be subjected to hardships. He could be prejudiced if it
is disclosed that he paid large attorney fees to defend against unfair labor
practice charges. Unions could use this information as a bargaining
wedge in future negotiations with the client. Thus, full disclosure may
tend to inhibit persuader activity by forcing an attorney to risk losing
clients by exposing them to public scrutiny.
Critics argue that full disclosure ignores the impact on the attorney-
client relationship and the innocent client, and exposes legitimate activi-
ties to public inspection. They further argue that the intended purpose of
81. Section 204 of the LMRDA states:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to require an attorney who is a mem-
ber in good standing of the bar of any State, to include in any report required to be filed
pursuant to the provisions of this chapter any information which was lawfully communi-
cated to such attorney by any of his clients in the course of a legitimate attorney-client
relationship.
29 U.S.C. § 434 (1982).
Section 204 exempts an attorney/persuader from filing financial disclosure reports because this
would breach the attorney-client relationship. However, this section does not completely relieve an
attorney of the obligation to report. Rather, he is excused from including certain information in the
report. An attorney must include communications made by the attorney to the client, receipts and
disbursements. However, this section excludes communications made by the client to the attorney.
Thus, the reporting requirements do not infringe on the attorney-client privilege. The report re-
quires the names of the attorney and the client, receipts from and disbursements made on behalf of
the client and the terms of the agreement. These facts are not protected by the attorney-client rela-
tionship. Cf In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 17-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), affd sub nom. Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963).
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disclosure is to publicize only persuader activity, not non-persuader ac-
tivity.8 2 The critics fail to note, however, that the goal of the statute is to
publicize persuader activity in order to give the employee enough infor-
mation about the persuader to put his speech in its proper context. Full
disclosure of the persuader's labor-related activities is necessary to edu-
cate the employee about the persuader's occupation.
IV.
Two circuit courts have held that disclosure requirements are not an
unconstitutional infringement on the employer's right to free speech.8 3
These courts recognized that full disclosure is permissible as long as the
chill on first amendment rights is justified by the legislative purpose.84
The analytical framework for examining disclosure requirements
against first amendment attack is set out in Buckley v. Valeo.85 Under
the Buckley analysis, the court must consider 1) the degree of infringe-
ment on first amendment rights, 2) the importance of the governmental
interest involved, and 3) whether a "substantial relation" exists between
the governmental interest and the information to be disclosed.8 6 The
courts in Master Printer's Ass'n and Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley
weighed these factors and determined that the burden imposed on the
persuader "is justified by the government's interest in maintaining anti-
septic conditions in the labor-relations setting."' 87 These courts, in apply-
ing Buckley, reasoned that the degree of infringement created by the
statute was not sufficient to outweigh the governmental interest involved.
According to these courts, the type of infringement required is a threat of
physical violence or loss of employment to the employer.88 The courts
also held that the statute is narrowly tailored to serve the governmental
interest in harmonious labor relations. 89 Finally, the courts found that
the statute was substantially related to the government compelling
82. See Note, Two Views of a Labor Relations Consultant's Duty to Report Under Section 203 of
the LMRDA, 65 MICH. L. REv. 752, 760 (1967). See also, Comment, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW., 541
(1970).
83. See Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley v. Donovan, 755 F.2d 1211, 1222 (6th Cir. 1985);
Donovan v. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140, 1150 (N.D. Il. 1981), afl'd, 699 F.2d 370 (7th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
84. Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley, 755 F.2d at 1221; Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp.
at 1147.
85. 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
86. Id.
87. Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley, 755 F.2d at 1220.
88. Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley, 755 F.2d at 1221; Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp.
at 1148 n.1l.
89. Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley, 755 F.2d at 1221-22; Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F.
Supp. at 1151.
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interest.90
The Eighth Circuit did not reach the first amendment issue, reason-
ing that the legislative history supported its interpretation of sections
203(b) and (c). The court noted, however, that had it reached the consti-
tutional question it would have had "difficulty perceiving the compelling
governmental interest to be served by [full disclosure]." 91 Thus, if the
court had reached the first amendment issue, it might well have tried to
argue that the statute chills the employer's first amendment rights, and
that the governmental interest in promoting harmonious labor relations
does not outweigh the chill on first amendment rights.
The Rose court's motivation in not reaching the first amendment
issue may have been to avoid applying the Buckley test to the particular
facts in Rose. Strained reasoning would be required in order for the Rose
court, under the Buckley test, to show that the law firm's right to not
disclose outweighed governmental interest in protecting harmonious la-
bor-relations. In applying Buckley as interpreted by the Sixth and Sev-
enth Circuits, the burden is on the persuader to show that full disclosure
would subject him to adverse consequences. In the absence of this show-
ing, the presence of harm is merely speculative, and there is no justifica-
tion for limiting disclosure. In Rose Law Firm, the statute's reporting
requirements are not a substantial burden on the employer's first amend-
ment rights. The reporting requirements do not pose a threat of physical
violence or loss of employment. 92 In addition, although the chill is not
inconsequential, the statute is narrowly tailored to preserve employee
rights while allowing employers to comment on labor matters. 93 Thus,
"[t]he government's compelling interest in maintaining harmonious labor
relations outweighs the chill placed upon [the employer's] exercise of its
first amendment rights."' 94 Finally, full disclosure is substantially related
to the government's compelling interest in maintaining antiseptic condi-
tions since full disclosure aids employees in understanding the source of
the information they are given during the election campaign. 95 As a re-
sult, the employee is capable of exercising his rights under the NLRA.
90. Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley, 755 F.2d at 1222; Master Printers Ass'n., 532 F. Supp.
at 1150 n.12.
91. The Rose Law Firm, 768 F.2d at 975.
92. Humphreys, Hutcheson and Moseley, 755 F.2d at 1221.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1222.
95. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Section 203(b) of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 requires an attorney or labor-relations consultant to file
monthly and annual financial disclosure reports with the Secretary of
Labor. Section 203(c) exempts reporting when the attorney or consult-
ant has not engaged in persuader activity. Because the language of sec-
tions 203(b) and (c) is ambiguous, the circuits are split as to whether a
persuader is required to report receipts and disbursements for persuader
activity only, or whether the persuader must disclose information with
respect to all labor-related clients. Congressional intent calls for full dis-
closure. The underlying premise of section 203(b) is to force persuaders
to publicly disclose their persuader activity so that workers can under-
stand the source of a persuader speech. While the effect of full disclosure
may be to inhibit persuader activity to some degree, two circuit courts
have held that the governmental interest in promoting harmonious labor
relations outweighs any chilling effect on persuader speech.
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